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FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTIONING AS A MEASURE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION 
FOR ADJUSTMENT IN ZAMBIA : PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Last week, on the 27th of February 1987, a certain local newspaper, 
having been informed of the topic for tonight's meeting , decided 
to place on its strategic page four, a long article in which a 
World Bank official - well-cushioned in his career because of the 
spoils derived from the looting of Developing countries by the 
institution he works for - issued what the paper called the 'prosecution's 
case' against the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to 
the paper the agreed facts were: 
that the economic pains of Sub-Saharan Africa were self-inflicted 
through wrong-headed policies adopted since independence; 
that these countries inherited healthy economies at independence 
(implying that colonialism had the mission of creating - 'good' 
economy) which were harmed by grievous errors, the most telling 
of which were: 
a) the rejection of capitalism and replacing it with statism; and 
b) buying political power and popularity by parastatalizing 
or nationalising 'successful' private enterprises and turning 
them into loss-making bases of politics and patronage; 
that these facts - which are the charges - aggravated the facts 
of lack of skill and lack of capital and technology. But there 
is the greatest crime - and here lies the 'prosecution's' final 
blow - the Africans ignored the basic fact that the human animal 
is selfish - and this failure led to the failure to utilise 
this basic attribute of human nature to the common good. Said 
the official: 
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"The way to turn this selfishness to common good 
is not to ignore it, condemn it, or preach against 
it, but to tap it for the benefit of the country 
by letting it produce the goods and services first 
and then taxing away some of these benefits for 
the use of the nation as a whole".1 
Typically, the prosecution - perhaps sensing that, actually, it is 
the one which should be the accused - runs away from its crime by a 
philosophical argument - that - philosophically speaking - human 
nature is basically selfish , therefore, there can be no prima facie 
case against the World Bank and the IMF for selfishly looting developing 
countries - for selfishly bringing upon Zambia, intolerable conditions 
for so-called adjustment. 
And typically also, the said paper, which by the way I have so far not 
mentioned by name - but which I am sure you know of already - puts itself 
to be the judge listening to the "always right" prosecution, decides 
that the accused, (the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa) are indeed guilty, 
and guilty of twenty years of economic mismanagement - and asks the 
condemned if they have anything to say in mitigation - and they say 
they have, and they list the following: 
a) that it is not all their fault since the wrong-headed policies were 
inherited from the colonial days; 
b) that there are external factors that have played havoc on their 
efforts at economic development; 
c) that they have no control of prices of their exports, the rise in 
the price of crude oil imports, etc; 
d) that there are civil wars and wars of independence which are not 
of their own making; 
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e) that there are natural calamities and negative factor endowments 
like poor soils which are not in their control. 
The paper stops there and the guilty are guilty. 
I should not continue this seeming comedy. If we honestly look at the 
background to the auctioning of Zambian foreign exchange resources and 
the effects of that liberalisation measure, together with other measures 
meant to 'correct' 'distortions' in the Zambian economy, then we will 
see that in fact, the prosecutor should be the one in the dock and the 
'accused' (here we mean governments of Sub-Saharan Africa) - as far 
as the masses of Zambia and of Africa, and of the Developing countries 
are concerned - should only be accomplices: 
Let me bore you briefly with what Zambia inherited at independence -
you know, the 'healthy' economy that our Mr Uche Mbanefo - now I have 
mentioned the Zambian based - World Bank bureaucrat by name - talks 
about. 
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Professor Seshamani, submitted to the inaugural meeting of the Economics 
Association of Zambia that at independence, the new state inherited 
a mononuclear economy characterised by the dominance of a one export 
commodity - copper - the mainstay of the economy in terms of its contri-
bution to GDP, its share of employment and of foreign exchange earnings. 
The allegedly healthy mononuclear economy had left Agriculture - a 
m a
jor sector - extremely backward and subsistence-oriented, operating 
in the main, outside the main-stream cash economy. 
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The vulnerability of such a mononuclear export-oriented economic structure 
is not difficult to see for those who believe that human nature is not 
basically selfish but that selfishness is historically formed and the 
form it takes corresponds to definite stages of social development; 
those who believe that the selfish capitalist of the World Bank or the 
IMF, or of the United States or the United Kingdom, is not a natural 
but a historical subject; those who believe that capitalism is not a 
natural system but a historically evolved one and one which is bound 
for exit from the stage of history. 
For the first ten years of independence - when copper production and 
world prices were high - the vulnerability of the Zambian economic structui 
was not manifest. The structural weakness of an inherited colonial 
export-oriented economy, heavily reliant on copper and with no internal 
linkages, showed itself with the effects of the first oil shock of 1973 
and the decline of copper prices since 1974. 
First, those who had inherited the state apparatus and were using it 
to accumulate from the revenue brought by copper exports imagined that 
the setbacks were temporary. The 'invisible hand' would get the copper 
prices back on the right track and the upward trend in the economy would 
continue. But for two decades the 'invisible hand' visibly and invisibly 
fails to do this and it is only in the eighties that Zambia realizes 
that the copper prices will not improve meaningfully. It is this late 
that the need for restructuring to lessen the dependence on copper is 
realised. But the problems had deepened. The economy was now experiencing 
negative growth rates in real GDP; high rates of inflation, a high ratio 
of debts to exports, a drastic decline in agricultural production, a 
high degree of underutilization capacity in industry, soaring unemploy-
- 5 -
ment, accelerated fall of the workforce from the 'formal' to the 'informal' 
sector etc. The list of ills is ad infinitum. 
In the drive to restructure the economy, two sectors were identified, 
Agriculture and Manufacturing. Agriculture was to be developed to achieve 
self-sufficiency in food while at the same time providing raw materials 
to the agro-industries which were seen as having potential for exports, 
and therefore, as possible alternative sources of foreign exchange. 
Manufacturing was seen as having tremendous potential for establishing 
linkages between primary production sectors (Agriculture and Mining) 
and secondary production sectors. 
But, while previously neglecting the agricultural sector, the Zambian 
dominant bloc had long tried to industrialize, to build a manufacturing 
sector which - contrary to the theses of those who claim that 
inherited colonial economies were 'healthy* - was fairly small in 
Zambia. A United Nations team in 1964 - year of Zambia's independence-
had indicated that this sector was insignificant. In 1984,.however, 
after a vigorous drive by the state to build a manufacturing sector 
via Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) the World Bank reported 
that Zambia was one of the few Sub-Saharan African countries with a 
relatively large manufacturing sector. The country was in the top 
league of industrial production in the region."* Yet, as Mudenda 
says in his essay on this question, there were serious faults with 
this state-led import substitution industrialisation. First, it 
did not enter into branches of production that would be integrative 
and self-sustaining, that would establish linkages with other branches 
and sectors. Significantly, it did not go into basic metal production 
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chemicals and engineering. It remained heavily dependent on foreign 
inputs by way of raw materials and technology and failed to arm itself 
with a sober, conscientious and skilled management. With the energy 
crisis and the consequent increases in the prices of manufactured 
goods, the depressed prices of traditional exports and consequent 
shortages of foreign exchange, the ISI enterprises suffered bottlenecks 
while many operated heavily below capacity. 
Seshamani emphasizes this point thus: 
"In 1982-83, the overall capacity utilization in manufacturing 
was 58 percent. This average is due to the high rates in the 
Textiles sector (72 percent) and non-metallic mineral manufacturi-
ng (70 percent) which is closely linked to the mining industry. 
In its annual report ( 1985), the Industrial Development 
Corporation, (INDECO), the parastatal holding company, stated: 
'Once again capacity utilization remained below economic levels, 
with many products registering a decline. Only 30 of 57 products 
registered utilisation of over 50 percent installed capacity. 
In a few cases the poor state of machinery had been the cause 
of such low capacity utilisation-,' while paucity of foreign exchange 
for processing raw materials was the single major contributory 
factor in most of the companies
1
.^ 
While the Zambian State had intervened in economic activities on 
the pretext that private enterprise was moving too slow in industriali-
sing the country, and that humanism required an "active visible hand" 
to develop the economy for the benefit of "man", the World Bank suggested 
in 1984 that restructuring the economy with a focus on Agriculture 
and Mining required shifts in policies and development strategies 
seen as inappropriate. The World Bank diagnosed the malaise of the 
manufacturing sector as: 
i) a trade strategy which emphasises import substitution supported 
by high levels of protection - this had to end; 
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ii) reliance on administrative mechanisms rather than the market 
forces in allocating resources - here you must note that the 
idea of foreign exchange auctioning was proposed by the World 
Bank and the IMF only jumped onto it later; 
iii) reliance on large scale, public sector investment as a leading 
edge of industrial development - therefore deparastatalization 
and privatisation was necessary.'' 
All these were the points by the selfish World Bank which does not 
want to be accused of selfishness, for that is human nature! Many 
people in Zambia and elsewhere accuse the World Bank precisely for 
being selfish, and rightly so, never mind the opinion of the Bank 
itself and that of our Financial Gazette. 
But let me hasten to add that the Bank and its allied institutions 
like the IMF have an accomplice - who by the way has little legitimacy 
to be prosecutor in this case - and that is the Zambian ruling bloc 
itself. Having inherited a colonial export-oriented monocultural 
economy and not changed one iota of it for two decades, and having 
established a significant state - controlled industrial base that 
achieved little in terms of real import substitution and that was 
grinding to a halt because of heavy external reliance, behind the 
backs of the broad sectors of the Zambian people, this ruling bloc 
allowed the imposition of difficult conditions on the people of the 
country by a selfish institution representing international capital. 
Macro-economic Policies Between 1964 and 1980 
Since independence, Zambia had a fixed exchange rate regime pegged 
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to the pound sterling. From December 1971 onwards, it came to be 
pegged to the US dollar. The shortage of foreign exchange experienced 
from 1974 onwards forced stringent control of allocations. An importer 
had to first obtain a licence from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
and then obtain foreign currency from the Bank of Zambia (BOZ). 
Due to scarcity, an import licence was not a guarantee for obtaining 
the foreign currency. Black markets for foreign currency developed 
and the exchange rates exceeded greatly the official rates. 
Nobody suggests that at the official level, there were no problems. 
Long delays, corruption and arbitrariness in allocations became rampant. 
Actual allocations, as Professor Seshamani and others note, turned 
out not to be ideal ones. They became biased in favour of essential 
consumer goods imports. Nobody denied that the overvalued Kwacha 
was making imports relatively cheaper, encouraging import-intensity, 
while also making the country's exports uncompetitive.^ 
Up to September 1985 the Central Bank was imposing ceilings on interests 
rates applied by Commercial Banks. Given the inflation rate,'the 
interest rates became negative in real terms and thus failed to promote 
savings while at the same time favouring capital intensive investments 
(and therefore not creating jobs). 
Up to December 1982, the Government was still pursuing its 'humanism' 
in which the "invisible hand" would not be left to determine whole-
sale and retail commodity prices. An "active visible hand" had to 
intervene to protect low income groups and curb excessive monopoly 
profiteering. Observers note that: "In practice, however, the fixed 
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prices established on a 'cost-plus' approach led to inefficient 
allocation of resources".^ Price controls plus the prevailing tarriff 
structures, led to negative effective protection for some goods whose 
production was discouraged as a result. Then, as in foreign exchange, 
a black market for goods developed with prices soaring well above 
the official prices. Most prices, especially of parastatal produced 
commodities led to reduced profitability, and thus making these enter-
prises have no accumulated resources to plough back for expanded 
reproduction^"Trading", as a leading Zambian economist notes, "... 
• 
became more profitable than production"." 
Tarriff barriers were erected to protect import substituting industry. 
Nominal tarriffs ranged from zero percent on priority items such 
as agricultural goods and essential consumer goods through 5-20 percent 
on intermediate and capital goods, to 50-150 percent on non-essential 
consumer durables. In 1977, an Industrial Development Act had been 
passed to promote industries through the use of local raw materials 
and skills, to develop linkages and diversify the industrial base 
and increase export earnings. In 1984 the World Bank complained 
that the Act was highly interventionist in tone and arbitrary with 
the discretionary powers of the minister concerned in granting import 
licences. The Bank argued that the Act discouraged investors and 
the transfer of technology and skill. Zambians on the other hand 
patriotically thought the Act was limited in its coverage and should 
have been wider to include development of a chemicals industry. 
In conditions of near-stagnation, the combination of pressure from 
external bilateral and multi-lateral aid donors, including the World 
Bank and the IMF, a number of drastic liberalising reforms were gradually 
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instituted. In December 1982 the Government decontrolled most wholesale 
and retail prices except for maize meal, wheat flour, bread and candles. 
Towards the end of 1986, even the prices of these were decontrolled. 
In January 1983 the Kwacha was devalued. In September 1985 the interest 
rate regime was deregulated and the Treasury Bill Rate was increased 
from 9.5 percent to 23.5 percent, and with this, the commercial lending 
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rates shot up to between 30 and 33 percent. 
A Small Industries Development Organization had been set up in November 
1982 to promote small-scale enterprises and local entrepreneurship. 
These were expected to be employment-generating through use of labour-
intensive methods and appropriate technology. They were expected 
to foster the development of a genuine ISI and decentralize activities 
to the regions. An Investment Act was passed in 1986 to overcome 
the limitations of the Industrial Development Act (IDA) and curb 
arbitrariness in the discretionary powers of the Minister of Commerce. 
This new Act also provided for the creation of an Investment Committee 
to deal with the task of creating an environment conducive for greater 
foreign investment. Also, import substituting projects were to be 
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overshadowed by a policy to open up the economy, and increase the 
export drive. An Exports Board was proposed to work on the promotion 
of non-traditional exports within the context of an Export-Oriented 
Industrialization Strategy (E0I). 
It is in the context of these liberalisation measures that the introduc-
tion of foreign exchange auctioning should be understood. Zambian 
economists note that there was convergence of thought, both from 
external and internal sources, that the Kwacha was overvalued. There 
was however no such convergence of thought over whether devaluation 
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via foreign currency auctioning was the road to adjustment. At first -
say Sakala, Siwale and Ndulo - "there was continuous consultation 
between policy-makers in Zambia and external institutions". Yet 
they also sense that the contribution of internal thought and institutions 
was relatively small. These economists note that the World Bank 
thought the solution to the overvaluation of the Kwacha lay in the 
removal of import licensing and administrative foreign currency allocation 
Extended discussion took place in the country with some elements 
in the state bureaucracy agreeing with the World Bank while officially, 
there was greater hostility to the auctioning idea. But by late 
1984, the economy was in serious trouble and the World Bank and IMF 
insisted on a massive devaluation of the Kwacha. The Zambian policy-
making sectors decide to investigate more on the idea of auctioning 
foreign currency. Say Sakala £t al: "In December, 1984, a small team 
from the Ministry of Finance and BOZ went to Uganda to study the 
auction system. On its return in January 1985, it prepared an 
unpublished report which recommended against the adoption of an auction 
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in Zambia". 
Now, we must note the selfishness of international capital, whose 
well-cushioned careerists are not even apologetic about it. In April 
1985, the current IMF agreement with Zambia lapsed. The neo-colony, 
gripped head-to-toe by the tentacles of international monopoly capital, 
was in a dire need of external resources. Drawings on a World Bank 
US$102.5 million in loans for Agriculture and Industry were about to 
start. But before disbursements could be made,a more "rational system 
°f allocation of the funds" was insisted on - i.e. - an auction system. 
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Come October 4, 1985, the neo-colony, beaten and defeated,announces 
the foreign currency auctioning.World Bank funds were disbursed. Other 
external donors, the USA, the UK, West Germany and Sweden also release 
their funds to finance the auction. 
How Zambians Responded 
Clearly, the class position determined one's response, but generally, 
the public (the broad sectors of the people) including the mainly 
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indigenous business community complained that they were not consulted. 
Those connected to foreign capital - the so-called expartriate business 
community - welcomed the auction. Said Mr. Murry Sanderson, Chairman 
of the Lutanda Group of Companies, in a paper to the Economics Association 
of Zambia: 
"Thought, whether political, social or economic is subject 
to fashion. A few years back, government control was all the 
rage. Now there is a strong swing away from that towards 
market forces, towards the liberalization .... Is this just 
another fashion? Can we expect the pendulum to swing back 
sooner or later towards controls and dirigiste policies? 
Personally, I do not think so. I think the move back to 
liberalism is a move back to fundamental economic principles -
I almost said to economic sanity - to principles which we in 
the less developed countries (LDCs) have neglected for many 
years, and I may add, have neglected with disastrous results. 
Among these principles is one which 30 years ago when I was 
a student, used to be declaimed by my economics lecturer, Peter 
Bauer ... Bauer never tired of repeating 'Supply and demand 
are functions of price-i..'At that time his was a voice crying 
in the wilderness. But truths remain true even when ignored".13 
Economists and small business people opposed the auctioning system 
for its likely inflationary impact on the economy. Others thought 
the Bank of Zambia should at least control the exchange rate rather 
than leave it to the dictates of the 'invisible hand'. Yet others 
saw it as a way of destroying the parastatals, of demobilising the 
state completely from playing a meaningful role in economic development. 
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Many feared a likely direct recolonisation by foreign monopoly capital. 
Advocates of the forex auction - mainly international finance capital 
and its internal and external supportive allies - argued that the 
new system, together with adopted structural adjustment measures 
would enable: 
a) greater substitution of domestically available inputs for imported 
ones which would be costlier with the depreciated Kwacha; 
b) greater substitution of labour for capital which, with increased 
interest rates, would prove costlier; 
c) greater success of non-traditional exports whose prices would be 
internationally competitive; 
d) greater foreign investment; 
e) greater number of small-scale industries across all provinces; 
and 
f) greater success in elimination of corruption and delay in allocation 
of foreign currency reserves and this, according to Mr. Sanderson 
of the Lutanda Group, brought planning back to 'the man on the spot
1 
rather than the central government bureaucrat. By 'man-on-the-spot' 
he meant monopoly capital's managers who could draw up plans for 
their operations "in confidence that they can buy whatever foreign 
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exchange they can afford". 
Dr. Mijere notes the concern of little capital, threatened by the auctioning 
system. The Chairman of the Zambia Federation of Employers declared 
to him thus: 
"Business operations have become uncertain and planning difficult 
due to the initial consequent instability of the Kwacha 
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and the linkage of all prices to the ruling foreign exchange rate. 
Entrepreneurs fear that as the resultant price increases passed 
onto the consumer, commodities will be beyond the reach of the 
majority of the peopleand thereby reduce the volume of business 
or even stagnate it".''-* 
How the Auction Operated (See Table I) 
In October 1985, the Kwacha was delinked from its basket of currencies 
and allowed to float on the auction floor. Imports were liberalised 
except for specified commodities. The decontrol of consumer and agricul-
tural prices was broadened. From the same date the Bank of Zambia rationed 
forex through auctioning except for transactions like debt service, 
government operations, ZCCM mining requirements, Zambia Airways, IATA 
Bills and Tazara. Capital Account external flows were controlled. 
But, in January, 1986 the range of transactions brought under the auction 
was expanded to include Zambia Airways, IATA Bills, Oil and Tazara payments. 
Capital complained that this would distort the exchange rate. 
Anybody could bid on the auction floor through their Commercial Bank 
provided they fulfilled administrative requirements which meant obtaining 
only a freely available import licence. Each week the BOZ announced 
the amount of forex available for auction and bidders applied stating 
how much they wanted and what for, and the Kwacha/dollar rate they were 
willing to pay. At the BOZ, a Foreign Exchange Management Committee 
processes the bids. A marginal rate is struck and it is that rate which 
exhausts the auction funds available. 
Before the first auction the exchange rate of the Kwacha with the US 
dollar was K2.35 for a dollar. It depreciated by 113.2 percent with 
the first auction, then had an upward trend which was also subject to 
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waddles. It reached a high of K15.25 to the dollar during week 60 of 
the auction. Policy makers were already stunned. They did not expect 
the exchange rate to depreciate beyond K7 per dollar during 1986. Traders 
panicked, bringing in quick-sale goods on the market in order to raise 
Kwachas for bidding. The exchange rate became even more distorted. 
The BOZ responded by policy instruments to influence the exchange rate. 
While it had resisted publicising details of the auction, it now did so 
hoping the 'selfishness' of high bidders would be curbed. But capital 
had wanted exactly this. The BOZ starts to reject some bids which it 
saw as intended to import non-essential quick-selling goods to raise 
Kwachas for bidding - e.g. - a firm's bid to import tyres and another's 
to import 1,000 pairs of shoes were rejected. The IMF intervened against 
these interventions. The BOZ tried to influence the exchange rate through 
the Treasury Bill Rates - and time and time again the Bank disbursed 
more funds than actually declared as available for auction in the week. 
In the first 52 weeks, there is actually no relationship between auctionable 
funds and disbursed funds, for example, in Auction 43 - the Bank declared 
$9 million as available but $20.7 million were actually disbursed. 
The Bank also delayed disbursing funds to successful bidders. But all 
this did not help the Kwacha. 
Then the BOZ requested IMF imperialism to allow introduction of the 
Dutch auction system which was thought to have an in-built system of 
controlling high bids. So far this has not helped the Kwacha. And 
the BOZ has been intervening to stabilise the Kwacha. As I am speaking 
to you, the State has suspended the auction precisely because of the 
erosion of the value of the Kwacha and the bad effects this is having 
on the economy. 
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The Effects 
True, the auction system eliminated subjectivity and corruption in 
allocation of forex. Firms now have wider and quicker access to forex. 
In July 1986, an official of Refined Oil Products was registering these 
successes. Spares and packaging materials could be obtained easier 
and quicker. Management could spend more time on productive operational 
matters than on pondering about financial issues. A number of big companies 
in similar standing recorded improvement in capacity utilization and 
operational efficiency. 
Firms were enabled to charge economic cost-recovery prices. The State 
had warned parastatals to be competitive or collapse. Subsidies to 
them were no more. Some were indeed awakened. Agricultural Farm Equipment 
Limited shifted their import regime from high cost capital goods like 
tractors to increased imports of spare parts. 
The monopoly of parastatals was broken forcing them into competition. 
For example, the Zambia Steel and Building Supplies Limited had a virtual 
monopoly in importing steel during the pre-auction days. After introduc-
tion of the auction, other firms like Lewis Construction obtained licences 
and now import steel directly, meaning the parastatal company can no 
more afford to be complacent and lethargic. Non-traditional exports 
are also picking up - cement, textiles and coffee were reported to be 
so while Mansa Batteries reported orders from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, 
Zaire and Burundi.^ 
But what are the negative effects? The World Bank had suggested there 
would be some 3 to 5 years or more before benefits start to show. But 
here are the costs. A most ubiquitous and conspicuous effect on industry 
-17-
has been a slump in demand. Decontrol of interest rates increased the 
cost of borrowing. The depreciation of the Kwacha, together with the 
change in the basis of duty and sales tax levies from f.o.b. to c.i.f., 
have tremendously pushed up the Kwacha value of imported inputs. All 
this combined to increase production costs. O.K., firms can charge 
cost-recovery prices - but the discrepancy is that the market simply 
cannot afford, thus, most firms face serious liquidity problems. They 
cannot sell unless they lower prices, but then the costs - already high -
are unrecoverable. As a result, notes Seshamani, 
"Most parastatal and small firms with poor cash flows find it ^ 
increasingly difficult to bid successfully on the Auction floor" 
Indeed, the participation of parastatal firms on the auction is insigni-
ficant given their dominance in the economy. With small firms, parastatals 
are being destroyed. Says Seshamani: 
"Already there is reliable anecdotal evidence that some small-
scale enterprises have closed down".1® 
On the standard of living of the people, things got worse. The commercial 
capitalist sector was in a state of panic because of the uncertainty 
of the exchange rate and the amount of dollars to be auctioned. There 
were therefore price hikes on all commodities. Says Dr. Mijere: 
"By reducing subsidies on essential commodities, the government 
authorised price increases on commodities. For example, the „ 
price of mealie-meal was increased by 40 percent and 50 percent". 
Table 2 illustrates the increases on essential commodities. In its 
survey in mid 1986, the Prices and Incomes Commission reported that 
the basket of commodities which accounted for approximately 55 percent 
of the total consumer expenditure "measured by the consumer price index 
(CPI) for the low income groups" had gone up by 53.50 percent. The 
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Commission concluded that the consumer, who spent K100 on the basket 
of commodities prior to the auction system, had, during the month of 
June 1986, to pay K154 for the same basket. The majority of the working 
people whose wages were static since October 1985 could only buy 65 
20 
percent of what was bought prior to auctioning. 
The auction system had tremendously eroded the workers' buying power. 
While commercial capital observed the exchange rate in fixing prices 
of commodities, the workers' wages and salaries were not pegged to the 
weekly marginal rate. Immiserization of the people accelerated. The 
wage and salary increases which were awarded in November 1985 were too 
insignificant to alleviate the effects of the erratic price increases 
brought about by the auctioning of forex and decontrolling of prices. 
So you can understand why there were riots in Zambia at the end of last 
year. 
As if this was not enough, one item in the IMF package for restructuring 
Zambia's economy was reduction of costs of production. The consequence 
of this 'rationalisation of costs' was retrenchment of thousands of 
workers. Table 3 gives an inexhaustive insight into the 'pruning' exercise. 
As recent as mid-February 1987, the local Financial Gazette was reporting 
heavy cuts in Zambia's civil service including demobilisation of thousands 
of teachers, allegedly in order to "minimise expenditure as well as 
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improve performance". Observers say the harmful effects of this attack 
on social services will be difficult to correct in future. The State, 
having been demobilised from control of economic activity and surrendered 
its power to the dictates of so-called 'market forces' (in reality the 
forces of monopoly capital), could no longer protect the jobs and the 
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lives of its citizens. Mr. Chiluba, Chairman General of the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) declared; 
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"Job security became the workers' nightmare". 
The question to pose in conclusion is; Is it possible for a small imperiali 
dominated developing country to make the liberalisation measures such 
as those Zambia embarked on and survive, let alone develop? Zaire has 
been on this road for over half a decade now and has given up after 
years of the state having surrendered to the IMF the power to direct 
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the economic development of the nation. Kaunda of Zambia is on record 
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as warning against exploitation by international monopoly capital. 
Under conditions of monopoly capital domination, conditions in which 
developing countries, Zambia included, are net exporters of much needed 
capital, conditions in which prices of the major exports fall dismally 
at the world market (Zambia's chief export - copper - had its world 
price fall by 60 percent in real terms between 1974 and 1984), conditions 
in which exports face serious protectionism in the developed capitalist 
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market economies, no development is possible. No resources can be 
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generated to finance internal restructuring and developmental projects. 
It must be concluded that all these factors point to a need for new 
political and economic strategies for development, strategies which 
are popular-based and internally oriented. Such strategies mean the 
need for political structures that are popular and dynamic, that demand 
from multilateral financial institutions and transnational corporations 
benefits for national development and are strong enough to reject the 
demands of imperialism where these contradict those of the nation. 
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Africa needs popular radical politics, it needs political regimes that 
place the people first, that realise the need to industrialise and develop 
national economies instead of leaving them as captive suppliers of raw 
materials, markets and cheap labour for international monopoly capital. 
Africa needs to curb the outward flow of its much needed capital and 
other resources. If this does not happen, an ominous social crisis 
















































K / Z 
Rate Struck 
2.75 - 15.0 79.7 16.9 4.8 5.01 
3.11 - 12.0 82.8 12.5 5.0 6.10 
2.44 - 9.15 69.1 10.3 5.2 7.00 
4.6 - 9.0 70.1 9.6 7.5 6.44 
4.22 - 8.51 53.0 8.0 6.1 6.25 
3.5 - 7.5 30.8 4.8 4.13 6.03 
4.22 - 7.5 31.2 5.1 3.96 5.80 
5.0 - 7.05 30.0 4.85 4.16 5.75 
4.52 - 7.0 27.3 4.59 4.2 5.74 
5.5 - 6.65 30.71 5.2 4.6 5.75 
5.6 - 7.05 27.35 4.63 4.3 5.77 
5.6 - 6.65 21.05 3.52 3.51 5.70 
4.95 - 6.50 29.46 5.01 4.59 5.76 
4.52 - 6.50 31.9 5.36 4.08 5.86 
4.52 - 7.50 41.53 6.6 5 3.3 6.01 
4.52 - 7.50 65.71 10.18 4.7 6.40 
4.0 - 7.50 40.58 6.48 6.06 6.36 
4.0 - 7.11 44.24 7.22 3.87 6.51 
6.0 - 7.15 45.21 6.65 5.17 6.68 
5.05 - 7.50 75.67 11.06 7.54 6.78 
5.54 - 7.50 71.53 10.2 5.36 7.01 
6.0 - 8.00 55.9 7.72 5.85 6.90 
6.5 - 9.50 53.16 7.44 5.62 6.75 
6.0 - 7.65 76.23 10.8 8.77* 6.91 
6.00 - 7.60 57.7 8.3 7.4 6.85 
6.50 - 7.60 58.1 8.3 7.2 6.87 
4.50 - 7.50 64.9 9.3 3.6 6.98 
6.50 - 7.50 81.5 11.4 8.6 7.0 6 
4.50 - 7.50 64.3 8.8 6.8 6.98 
5.50 - 7.50 50.9 7.2 6.4 7.00 
6.9Q - 7.50 63.3 8.9 7.6 7.03 
5.50 - 7.50 75.3 10.5 3.7 7.11 
6.25 - 8.00 50.8 7.0 3.9 7.23 
6.50 - 8.00 74.9 10.1 7.3 7.31 
6.51 - 7.75 53.2 7.2 3.9 7.26 
7.10 - 7.65 82.2 11.1 6.9 7.32 
Auction Bid Hange Kwacha 
Number Amount 
Offered 
37 5.00 - 7.61 90.2 
38 5.50 - 7.70 92.2 
39 5.50 - 8.10 116.6 
40 5.50 - 9.00 103.1 
41 5.00 - 9.51 135.6 
42 4.01 - 9.53 166.6 
43 5.01 - 9.10 169.0 
44 4.01 - 7.53 99.3 
45 4.50 - 6.85 89.4 
46 5 . O O - 6 . 8 5 111.3 
47 5.00 - 7.75 136.7 
48 5.00 - 7.99 164.9 
49 5.00 - 8.01 94.7 
50 4.50 - 7.83 101.5 
51 5.10 - 8.00 136.9 
52 5.04 - 8.11 165.1 
{J Amount § Amount IC/$ 
Requested Secured Rate Struck 
12.2 8.0 7.39 
12.3 6.9 7.51 
15.2 7.6 7.71 
12.9 3.9 8.07 
16.7 4.4 5.03 
21.6 7.5 6.08 
24.0 20.7 5.01 
17.5 10.2 5.35 
15.4 5.9 5.76 
18.2 3.8 6.26 
20.4 8.8 6.87 
22.8 13.6 7.00 
12.9 10.1 5.64 
16.3 3.1 6.37 
20.1 6.0 7.09 
22.8 5.3 7.64 
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Table 2 
AVERAGE PRICES AND MOVEMENTS 
COMMODITY PRICES PRICES PRICES 
October 1985 June 1986 DEVELOPMENT 
1. B/Meal (25 kg) K19.78 K19.45 -1.7 
2. R/Meal (25 kg) K15.32 K15.59 1.8 
3. Bread (800 g) K00.90 K 1.87 107.8 
4. Chicken (1 kg) 6.79 9.74 43.30 
5. D/Kapenta (1 kg) 8.92 16.71 86.30 
6. F./Kapenta (1 kg) 3.92 7.00 78.60 
7. C/Oil (2.5 It) 17.57 15.78 -10.20 
8. Sugar (1 kg) 2.18 3.40 56.00 
9. Tomato (1 kg) 1.23 2.55 107.30 
10. Onion (1 kg) 1.53 4.65 203.90 
11. Rape (1 kg) 1.79 1.98 10.60 
12. Brisket (1 kg) 6.50 8.16 25.50 
13. O/Mince (1 kg) 6.90 8.25 19.60 
14. Mixed cut (1 kg) 5.53 7.44 34.50 
15. D/Beans (1 kg) 3.26 5.02 54.00 
16. Candles (1 x 6) 9.00 7.57 -15.90 
17. Charcoal (1 bag) 7.75 12.00 54.80 
18. F/milk (750 ml) 0.62 0.81 30.60 
19. Egg (1 Unit) 2.75 3.60 30.90 
20. Matches (1 box) 0.08 0.16 100.00 
21. Tanganda (100 gm) 2.27 2.59 14.10 
22. B/Bond (100 gm) 2.45 2.65 9.00 
23. F/Salt (1 kg) 1.39 1.99 43.20 
24. Detergent 2.35 4.37 86.00 
25. Soaps (bar) 1.21 1.68 38.80 
B/Meal Breakfast Meal C/Oil Cooking Oil 
R/Meal Roller Meal O/Mince Ordinary Mince 
D. Kapenta Dried Kapenta D/Beans Dried Beans 
F/Kapenta Fresh Kapenta F. Milk Fresh Milk 
B./Bond Brooke Bond F. Salt Fine Salt 





COMPANY NO. OF WORKIRS 
DISMISSED 
REASONS GIVEN 
ZCCM 3,000 As part of Company's cost 
saving measures, TOZ, 
4/8/86 
ZCCM 2.250 Dismissed in June 1985 
because of the strike over 
the Mukuba Pension Scheme 
The State 5.000 It is better to prune a few 
workers than the whole 
nation to sink. 
ZAFFICO 400 As part of the World Bank 
recommendation for the 
company to retain a manageable 
labour force. 15/4/66 
ZAMOX 120 To enable the firm to 
survive the present economic 
crisis. 
Ministry of Works 
and Supply 600 As cost saving measures. 
Kitwe District Council 200 A3 cost saving measures. 
94 companies 3,000 To save operational costs. 
Firms 3,511 To counter the unfavourable 
economic climate worsened 
by the lack of foreign 
exchange (TOZ, 3/7/86). 
ZCCM Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited 
ZAFFICO Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation 
ZAMOX Zambia Oxygen 
Sources Times of Zambia (TOZ) 
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